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In response to the financial crisis and its repercussions on financial 
institutions, the new regulatory requirements relating to the 
management of bank liquidity have been introduced. For a better 
management of the liquidity risk, and a more adequate estimate of the 
potential risk incurred by the bank CDG Morocco, the stress tests 
represent a method for a precise evaluation of the risk. Liquidity risk is 
an important risk class, it needs its own risk measures such as the net 
stable financing rate (NSFR) and Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) as 
prescribed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
The purpose of this paper is to study the liquidity of the CDG bank by 
the stress test technique to make decisions on the financial state of the 
bank. 
 
                 Copy Right, IJAR, 2019,. All rights reserved. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….... 
Introduction:- 
Stress tests is a term that describes a series of techniques used to assess a portfolio's vulnerability to major changes 
in the macroeconomic environment or to exceptional but plausible events. They were originally developed for use at 
the portfolio level, to understand how the value of a portfolio changes if there are significant changes to its risk 
factors (such as asset prices). 
 
Stress tests are quantitative tools used by bank supervisors and central banks to assess the soundness of financial 
systems in the case of extreme shock, but still plausible (macroeconomic stress tests). They are also an important 
management tool for banks as they provide financial institutions with useful insights into the reliability of internal 
systems designed for risk measurement (microeconomic or prudential stress tests). 
 
Until the first half of 2007, interest in stress testing had been limited to practitioners, namely risk managers or even 
central banks and financial supervisors. Since then, the global financial system has been affected by deep turbulence 
and all major economies have been affected by high volatility in the financial markets, deteriorating portfolio values, 
widespread renegotiation of risks and liquidity drying up. severe (see Appendix 1). It was pointed out that the 
severity of the crisis was largely due to its unexpected nature and that a more thorough and rigorous use of stress test 
methodologies would probably have helped to mitigate the intensity and impact of the crisis. crisis. The first section 
is an introduction to stress tests which includes the conceptual framework of the stress test, a literature review and a 
simulation of the liquidity stress test. In the second section, we discuss the role and coverage of a stress test. The 
third section discusses the typologies of a stress test. Finally, in the fourth section we will talk about the 
methodology of conduct of stress tests in the CDG Morocco bank. 
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Literature review   
Stress tests: Conceptual framework 
According to the Committee on the Global Financial System (2005), stress-testing is a risk management tool used to 
assess the potential impact on a business of a specific event and / or movement in a set of financial variables. As a 
result, stress-testing is used as an adjunct to statistical models such as Value-at-Risk (VaR), and increasingly, it is 
considered a complement rather than a supplement, to these measures. statistics. 
 
Some authors consider stress tests as a subgroup of risk modeling with a focus on "tail" events that is 
complementary to "conventional" methods such as Value at Risk (VaR) and should be included in a global risk 
model
1
. Others see stress testing as a separate approach that goes beyond the past shock distribution used in VaR 
and is more of an "art" than a science - (Kupiec, 1995) [1]. The IMF
2
 considers stress-testing from a 
macroeconomic point of view and defines it as a key element of macroprudential analysis that tracks and anticipates 
potential vulnerabilities in the financial system. Stress tests also focus on vulnerabilities
 3 
of the financial system, 
including the banking system, macroeconomic and sectoral shocks. 
 
Review of the literature on stress tests of the banking sector  
The first models of stress tests in the banking sector, which were initially based on simple historical scenarios linking 
macroeconomic developments with variables in the financial sector (Blaschke et al., 2001) [2], have been developed in 
more sophisticated models integrating the risks of market rates, credit and interest and the capture of inter-
institutional contagion and feedback effects between the financial sector and the real economy. These relatively 
complex models have become regular tools for analyzing the resilience of the financial sector - see, for example, 
Denmark’s National Bank (2010, p. 45), Oesterreichische National Bank (2010, p. 51), Norway Bank (2010, p. 
49.), the Bank of England's RAMSI (Systemic Risk Assessment Model for Institutions) (Aikman et al., 2009) [3], 
and the ECB (2011) [4]. Nevertheless, the global financial crisis has revealed deficiencies in the stress testing 
methodologies used in many countries. Before the crisis, many tests led to the mistaken belief that the sector should 
remain stable even in the event of major shocks (Haldane, 2009). [5]; Borio & al, 2012) [6]. These deficiencies are 
not only related to the unfavorable scenario configuration used, which initially seemed unlikely, but were often 
exceeded in reality, but also to the supposed combination of shocks, which had not been sufficiently anticipated in 
the scenarios (Ong and Čihák, 2010 [7]; Breuer & al., 2009) [8]. 
 
A role is also played by deficiencies in the calibration of the model and the presumed behavior of banks and 
markets, and in the absence of liquidity stress tests that go with other types of traditional financial risks (notably 
credit risk and credit risk). interest rate risk). The panic after the fall of Lehman Brothers
4 
confirmed the importance 
of the spiral between the market and the liquidity of funding and its frail link to the solvency of institutions (Gorton, 
2009 [9]; Brunner Meier & al, 2007.) [10]. This problem in stress-testing devices is also demonstrated by Ong and 
Čihák (2010) [11] using the example of Iceland, where the banking sector collapsed in the autumn of 2008, even 
though stress tests conducted in mid-2008 had indicated that it was stable and resistant to various shocks. As a 
result, the assumptions and parameters used in stress tests are progressively re-examined so that the tests can better 
understand the impact of violent shocks on the financial system. Stress testing is becoming a standard tool in the 
new macroprudential framework (FSB 2011 [12]; BCBS, 2012) [13], but there are doubts about their ability to serve 
as an early warning device
5
. Yet, despite a clear consensus on the importance of stress testing, there are many 
disadvantages associated with methodological approaches to stress and the construction of valid and severe 
scenarios (Jakubík and Sutton, for example) 2012) [14]. 
 
Buncic and Melecky (2012) [15] give some practical suggestions on some of these difficulties (such as how to 
construct stress scenarios if there are no stress periods in the estimation sample) and to provide an empirical 
application of the proposed method for the banking sector of a country in Eastern Europe. Still, stress tests are a 
relatively new tool and could therefore experience significant methodological development and refinement in the 
future. The recent financial turmoil has suggested some ways in which this methodological development should be 
directed. A recent report published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2012) [16] on best 
                                                         
1 Berkowitz, 1999 
2 voir Sundararajan et al., 2002 
3 Voir Haldane 2009a and 2009b 
4 Brunnermeier et al, 2009 
5
 
Borio et al, 2012 
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practices in macroprudential analysis highlighted the need to overcome the bias of the potential decline in risk 
estimation during the use of estimated models on quiet period data. 
 
Simulations of liquidity stress tests 
A liquidity stress test examines whether financial institutions have sufficient cash and cash inflows to withstand 
cash outflows in a stress scenario. Financial institutions may experience sudden cash outflows, for example, 
because of: 
1.  Sudden suffering of their funding 6.  
2. The interconnections between the market liquidity of assets and the liquidity of financing.  
3. A lack of liquidity for financial institutions when they can no longer generate enough liquidity to respond to a shock. 
 
Coverage of a stress test 
Coverage of stress tests
7
 has increased beyond the basic risk assessment. On the asset side, stress tests tend to focus 
on tradable market portfolios. On the liability side, funding liquidity for individual institutions is stressed at 
different levels. Scenarios include changes in: customer behavior; credits, financing costs and warranty 
requirements. 
 
The role of a stress test 
Stress testing is a risk management tool used to evaluate the potential impact of a specific event and / or movement in a 
set of financial variables on a company. As a result, stress tests are used as adjunct to statistical models such as value at 
risk (VaR), and increasingly, it is considered a supplement rather than a supplement to these statistical measures. Stress 
tests are generally divided into two categories: scenario tests and sensitivity tests. In scenario stress tests, the source of 
the shock, or the stress event, is well defined, as are the financial risk parameters that are affected by the shock. On the 
other hand, the sensitivity tests specify the financial risk parameters, the source of the shock is not identified. 
Stress can: capture the impact of large but plausible large claims on a portfolio and allow us to understand the risk 
profile of the firm through a risk assessment of the company. 
 
Typology of stress tests 
The microprudential stress tests
8
 emphasize the traditional role of bank capital as a buffer against loss. Table 1 
describes the five main features of a microprudential test. 
 
Table1:-Elements of a microprudential stress test 
Goal The goal is to assess bank holdings properly and to determine that the ability to assume the 
appropriate loss is in place to protect taxpayers from having to bail out insured deposits.  
Scope Analyze one bank at a time, or use data from multiple banks to overcome information 
imperfections on the asset values of individual banks. 
Deposit 
Considerations 
Count the amount of insured deposits and the amount of subordinated debt and equity. The 
required loss absorption is calculated as a ratio to the risk of the asset. 
Asset 
Considerations 
The credit risk of different assets determines the risk of the business, so that the loss of 
commitment absorption is linked to the asset mix. A capital ratio therefore naturally emerges as a 
basis for supervision. 
Output Develop guidance on closing a bank and when to sell assets to maximize taxpayer recovery. 
Source: Stressed Out: Macroprudential Principles for Stress Testing Working Paper No:71. Chicago Booth Paper 
No.12 
 
Macroprudential stress tests are based on the idea that an economy must maintain the ability of its banking sector to 
channel savers' deposits to borrowers for support of real economic activity. The main fear is that individual middlemen, 
when struck with a common shock, will jostle for survival by reducing their deposits
9
. 
Mitigating damage from asset liquidation, credit tightening and repayment defaults is a central goal of 
macroprudential regulation. Macroprudential Stress Test Naturally Serves as Part of the Macroprudential Toolkit
10
. 
                                                         
6 Schmieder et al. 2012 
7 http://www.c-ebs.org/documents/GL03stresstesting.pdf 
8 See the survey of the BCBS (2012) 
9
  
See Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008) for a model showing how the depreciation of capital to leveraged financial intermediaries can lead to a contraction magnified 
the availability of credit, Hirtle, Schuermann and Stiroh (2009) state that the American stress test included the macroprudential objective of facilitating all loans.. 
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Stress management stress tests 
 
Stress tests were also used, especially after the recent crisis, to assess whether key financial institutions should be 
recapitalized or not, possibly with the support of the public authorities. In recent IMF programs with distressed banking 
sector (including Ireland, Greece
11 
and Portugal), estimating bank recapitalization needs through stress tests is an 
important element. Since the use of stress tests as a crisis management tool is relatively new, Table 10 presents the 
main characteristics, the similarities with, and the differences of the other types of stress tests, using three recent 
examples of this type. stress tests
12 
(SCAP US, CEBS / EBA tests in 2010 and 2011, and the 2012 EBA capital 
assessment exercise) as illustrations. 
 
Methodology:- 
Stress testing of liquidity risk 
There are two main types of liquidity risk: Asset liquidity risk and financing liquidity risk. Asset liquidity risk refers to 
the inability to conclude a transaction at a certain price because of the size of the transaction. This type of liquidity risk 
will come into play when certain assets need to be liquidated quickly (a "liquidation of assets"). Financing liquidity risk 
refers to the inability to access sufficient funds to meet its timely payment obligations. 
 
Banks are under constant liquidity pressure because of the nature of their business. Banks finance long-term loans with 
short-term liabilities, and maintain an unusually large portion of their liabilities in the form of outstanding debt. As a result, 
banks face liquidity pressures
13 caused by imbalances between the maturity dates of their assets and their liabilities, 
which implies that cash inflows from assets cannot match cash outflows to cover commitments. Changes in interest 
rates can also lead to liquidity problems. A high interest rate can cause liquidity withdrawals as depositors look for 
higher returns elsewhere. 
 
Stress testing at the portfolio level 
Stress tests begin with the specification of the type of risks to be considered and the appropriate models to use. 
Stress tests can focus on individual risks, such as credit risk or interest rate risk, or can encompass multiple risks. 
Developing a scenario involves estimating or making assumptions about the interdependence between the main 
economic and financial factors that underlie it: interest rate, GDP, unemployment rate, share price, price index to the 
consumption, real estate prices. The selected scenario will be applied to all relevant positions (on and off-balance 
sheet) of the institution. 
 
The next step in a stress test is to decide on the set of factors to include, followed by the scenario specification. Stress 
tests
14 
may involve estimating the impact of a change in a single risk factor (a sensitivity test), or the effect of 
simultaneous movement in a group of risk factors (a scenario analysis). Stress tests may be based on historical 
scenarios, shocks that have occurred in the past, or may be based on hypothetical scenarios, constructed to account 
for plausible changes in circumstances that have no historical precedent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
10
 
See Kashyap; Berner and Goodhart (2011) and Goodhart; Kashyap, Tsomocos and Vardoulakis (2012) for additional tools that would complement the stress tests. 
11
 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/News--Communications/Year/2011/The-EBA-publishes-Recommendation-and- finalresults.aspx. 
12 In accordance with the agreements published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in September and December 2010. See 
http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.htm 
13
 
See IMF, 2008, 2010; Frank et al, 2008 
14 Ong & Čihàk (2010) 
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Figure 1:-sequence of the course of a stress test 
 
 
 
Source: Stress testing of financial systems an overview of issues, methodologies and FSAP experiencesing 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of risk model 
Market risk                 
Interest rate risk 
Credit risk Other (operational         
liquidity) 
Type of stress test 
Single factor sensitivity Multifactor scenarios Others (extreme values) 
Shock type 
Individual market 
variables 
Hypothetical 
Highlight correlations 
Scenario type 
Historical 
Highlight volatilities 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
Main assets to shock, peripheral assets to be shocked, magnitude of shocks and time 
horizon 
Aggregation (business units, online products) and portfolio revaluation (market to mark), 
comparison with the current portfolio, adjustment to present and portfolio risk 
management techniques. 
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Type of scenarios
 
 
Historical scenarios:  
Historical data is an important benchmark for liquidity risk stress tests. At a minimum, it is important that banks be 
able to withstand shocks of a magnitude similar to those that have occurred in the past. Similarly, in the case of 
developing countries, authorities can use withdrawals observed in other peer group countries in crisis situations as a 
reference. 
 
Hypothetical scenarios:  
Given the difficulty of modeling hypothetical scenarios based on macroeconomic scenarios: The hypothetical 
scenarios have the advantage of allowing a more flexible formulation of potential events, as well as encouraging risk 
managers to be more forward looking. Hypothetical scenarios can be constructed by extreme market factors 
(shocks), volatility, or correlations. This approach determines the sensitivity of a portfolio to different risk factors. 
The main disadvantage of hypothetical scenarios is the difficulty in determining the probability of occurrence of an 
event because it is beyond the scope of the experiment. 
 
Monte-Carlo simulation:  
Consists of repeatedly simulating the random process that governs prices and market rates. Each simulation 
(scenario) generates a possible value for the portfolio at the target horizon. If enough scenarios are generated, the 
simulated distribution of the value of the portfolio converges to the real distribution. 
 
Theory of extreme values:  
It is the statistical theory of the tails of the probability of distributions that tries to better identify the risks of loss in 
extreme circumstances. The advantage is that this method is not limited by the normal distribution assumption, and 
therefore can accommodate asymmetric and thick-tail portfolio change distributions. However, the approach 
assumes that extreme events are not correlated, which may not be true in reality, and therefore the consequences for 
the portfolio may be distorted. 
 
Sensitivity analyzes 
Sensitivity analysis involves applying simple stress to a risk factor considered in isolation to assess the institution's 
sensitivity to this risk factor. Institutions may consider, for example, a simple stress of interest rate change, a simple 
change in probabilities of default (PD), the default of their largest counterparties, or a decline in the value of assets. 
liquids. Such analyzes provide insights into key risks and provide a better understanding of potential risk concentrations 
associated with one or more factors. 
 
As a first step, the institutions will determine the relevant risk factors, and in particular. Then, the institutions will be able 
to submit to more or less severe stress the risk factors identified. 
 
The severity of the stress to be applied on a single factor will probably be influenced by the experience of long-term 
historical data. 
 
Top-down or bottom-up
15
 exercises
 
 
Once a set of scenarios has been implemented in a coherent macroeconomic framework, the next step is to translate 
the different outputs into the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of the financial institutions. There are two 
main approaches to translating scenarios into balance sheets: the bottom-up approach, where estimates are based on 
individual portfolio data, and the top-down approach, which uses data. aggregated or macroeconomic to estimate the 
impact. 
 
Test stress test application for the case of CDG capital. 
Stress test of the liquidity coefficient 
The present liquidity stress tests are based on the balance sheet in December 2012. The assumptions are based on the 
different international approaches already in force. They are also based on a refined collar of different tests and 
simulations made by several international experts
16
. We have also taken into consideration the guidelines dictated by 
                                                         
15 Next Generation System-Wide Liquidity Stress Testing Christian Schmieder, Heiko Hesse, Benjamin Neudorfer, Claus Puhr, Stefan W. Schmitz 
16 Martin Čihák IMF working paper WP/07/59 Introduction to Applied Stress Testing. 
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the BAM directive on stress tests
17
, which presents a precise idea on the application and the implementation of a 
stress test device at the national level and on which one will be able to be based to carry out our own tests of stress 
tests. 
 
Data and results:- 
V.1.1 Data presentation 
We see that liquid assets represent 145% of term deposits and are greater than all CDG capital deposits. This is due 
first of all to the nature of CDG capital which is an investment bank, and also to the fact that the Moroccan stock 
market is almost hibernating. 
 
Table 2:-Basic data table for liquidity stress tests:Simple liquidity test (in thousands of dirhams) 
 Simple Scenario Scenario Medium High scenario 
Term deposit (domestic currency) 1551078 1 551 078  1 551078  
Withdrawal per day (%) 5 20 90 
Demand deposit (domestic) 652 316 652316  652316  
Withdrawal per day (%) 20 40  65  
Foreign currency deposit 32847 32847 32847  
Withdrawal per day (%) 30 50  70  
Liquid assets 2 263 093 2263093  2263093  
Available per day (%) 40 55 30 
Less active or non-liquid assets 1 809 758 1809758 1809758  
Available per day (%) 60 80 1 
 
V.1.2 Presentation of the hypotheses 
We will consider three scenarios, a simple scenario with simple assumptions whose effects of liquidity risks are only 
slightly felt; a medium scenario with stronger effects and a high scenario with assumptions that represent extreme 
but plausible liquidity risk effects. 
 
Assumptions for five-day term and demand deposit withdrawals (in both national and foreign currencies) are 
summarized in Table 3: 
 
Table 3:-Assumptions for five-day term and demand deposit withdrawals (in both national and 
foreign currencies)  
A term deposit Demand deposit 
Scenario Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Scenario Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 
Simple 10 10 20 75 65 Simple 95 90 85 70 60 
Medium 10 20 30 60 100 Medium 90 80 70 55 100 
High 20 35 45 100 100 High 75 70 55 100 100 
Term deposit with foreign currency 
Scenario Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 
Simple 105 10 15 20 25 
Medium 10 25 35 45 60 
High 25 35 40 55 70 
 
The assumptions relating to the sales of CDG Capital's assets, as well as the respective haircuts, are also spread over 
five days and are summarized in Table 4: 
 
Table 4:-table presenting the assumptions of stress test simulation of the liquidity ratio  
Liquid assets Non-liquid assets 
Withdrawal Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Scenario Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 
Simple 40 30 20 10 0 Simple 5 4 3 2 1 
Medium 30 25 15 10 0 Medium 5 3 1 0 0 
                                                         
17 For more details, consult the directive n ° 2 / G / 2010 on the practice of stress tests by banks. 
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High 40 30 20 0 0 High 3 1 0 0 0 
Discount Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Discount Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 
Simple * * * * * Simple * * * * * 
Medium * * * 1 2 Medium * 2 3 4 5 
High * 1 2 3 4 High * 3 4 5 6 
 
Presentation of results (see appendix 2) 
 
Figure 2:-Result of liquidity stress tests in favor of CDG capital 
 
 
At the first day, we see that the money inflows are largely positive. This is due in the first place to the fact that the 
effects of the financial crisis are not felt not only in stock markets but also among depositors. Even people who are 
aware of the crisis still make the capital CDG's balance sheet strong and the financial system robust. 
 
On the second day, the medium and high scenarios plunge into the negative, while the simple scenario based on 
assumptions with low crisis effects is only slightly positive. This is due to doubts that are starting to settle among 
depositors and speculators. More and more depositors withdraw their money and the financial markets succumb to 
the effects of doubt. A liquidation of assets which is only the consequence of a sale of a large number of assets, is 
born. An asset offer that is net of demand leads to a drop in asset prices and the application of several haircuts to 
asset prices. 
 
On the third day, the three scenarios are red. The situation is characterized by a massive withdrawal of deposits, a 
forced sale and a liquidation of assets and an extreme application of haircuts. The supervisory and supervisory 
authority (BANK AL-MAGHRIB) is obliged to intervene to save the financial system from an insured ruin. 
 
Stress test of the liquidity ratio in the short term (L.C.R). 
Presentation of the hypotheses 
The assumptions relating to the withdrawal of term and demand deposits (in national and foreign currencies) of the 
respective capital CDG are spread over five days as shown in Table 5: 
 
Table 5:-table presenting LCR stress test simulation assumptions. 
Stable Deposit Less stable deposit 
Scenario Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Scenario Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 
Simple 90 90 80 75 65 Simple 5 10 15 30 40 
Medium 90 80 70 60 100 Medium 10 20 30 45 0 
High 80 65 45 100 100 High 25 30 45 100 0 
-1000000
-500000
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3
The money flows since the beginning of the year 
Simple Scenario Medium Scenario High Scenario
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The assumptions relating to the sales of CDG Capital's assets, as well as the respective haircuts, are spread over five 
days as shown in Table 6: 
 
Table 6:-table presenting LCR stress test simulation assumptions. 
Very liquid assets -A1- Liquid Assets -2A- 
Scenario Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Scenario Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 
Simple 40 30 2 010 0 Simple 5 10 15 20 25 
Medium 3 025 15 10 0 Medium 10 25 35 45 60 
High 40 30 20 0 0 High 25 35 40 55 70 
Discount Discount 
 * * * * *  * * * * * 
* * * 1 2 * * 1 2 3 
* 1 2 3 4 * 2 3 4 5 
   
Assets that are not liquid or poorly liquid-2B- 
Simple 5 4 3 2 1 
Medium 5 3 1 0 0 
High 3 1 0 0 0 
Discount 
Simple * * * * * 
Medium * * * 1 2 
High * 1 2 3 4 
 
V.2.2 Presentation of LCR results (see Appendix 3) 
 
Figure 10:-Result of stress tests on short-term liquidity ratio in favor of CDG Capital 
 
At the first day level, there is a slight decrease in inflows of money. This is due in the first place to the fact that the 
effects of the financial crisis are not felt not only in stock markets but also among depositors. Even the people who 
are aware of the crisis are still the strength of the capital CDG balance sheet and the robustness of the financial 
system. 
 
On the second day, the medium and high scenarios plunge into the negative, while the simple scenario based on 
assumptions with low crisis effects is only slightly positive. This is due to doubts that are starting to settle among 
depositors and speculators. More and more depositors withdraw their money and the financial markets succumb to 
the effects of doubt. A liquidation of assets which is only the consequence of a sale of a large number of assets, is 
born. An asset supply that is well above demand leads to a drop in asset prices and the application of several haircuts 
to asset prices. 
-3000000
-2500000
-2000000
-1500000
-1000000
-500000
0
500000
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Net cash inflows since begining: Scenarios Stress Tests 
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On the third day, the three scenarios are red. The situation is characterized by a massive withdrawal of deposits, a 
forced sale and a liquidation of assets and an extreme application of haircuts. The supervisory and supervisory 
authority (BANK AL-MAGHRIB) is obliged to intervene to save the financial system from an insured ruin. 
 
Conclusion:- 
For each type of risk (interest rate risk, market risk, foreign exchange risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, etc.), it is 
necessary to decide on the type of stress test to be carried out (sensitization). the scenario, the extreme value, the 
maximum loss), the type of shock to be applied (to individual market variables, underlying volatility or 
correlations), the type of scenario to consider (hypothetical, historical simulation, Monte Carlo); as well as the 
assets must be shocked by how much, and over what period of time. For an overall stress test, it is also important 
to decide which institutions to include in the analysis, and how to aggregate, present and interpret the results
18
. 
In its simplest form, a stress test is a way of reassessing a portfolio using a set of different assumptions. The results 
of a stress test show the sensitivity of the wallet to a particular shock, or a set of shock following the methodology 
used (stress test of scenes or sensitivity) extreme but plausible. Stress tests can be useful because for most asset 
markets, the history of returns does not provide enough information about the markets' behavior under extreme 
events. Stress tests complement traditional models with estimates of how the value of a portfolio changes in 
response to the exceptional but plausible changes in the underlying risk factors. 
 
We will see throughout this chapter a definition and a conceptual framework of stress testing in the first section. A 
definition of the role and coverage of a stress test. In the third section a spread of the different types of stress tests 
and in the fourth section the methodology for the conduct of a stress test. 
 
In the last section, a practical application of the stress tests to the case of CDG capital at the liquidity ratio level as 
well as the short-term liquidity ratio, with an interpretation of the results obtained. 
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Appendix: 
 
Appendix 1:-Liquidity in the money markets of the euro zone. 
 
Source: European central bank. Working Paper Series, no 1 0 0 8 / February 2009 Liquidity (risk). Concepts definitions 
and interactions. By Kleopatra Nikolao 
 
Appendix 2:-Stress test of the liquidity ratio (based on December-2012) 
   Simple 
Scenario  
Medium 
Scenario  
High Scenario  
Day # 1 
Term deposit (domestic) 1 395 970 1 395 970 1 240862  
Demand deposit (domestic) 32 616  
 
65 232  
 
163 079  
 
Demand deposit (foreign) 31 205 29 562 24 635 
New cash outflow (during a day)  776 450 745 477 807 664 
Liquid assets (after 1 day) 1 357 856 1 584 165 1 357856 
assets less or non-liquid (after 1 day) 1 719 270 1 719 270  0 
New cash inflow (during one day) 995 725  769 416  2 714995 
Net cash inflow since the beginning of the year 219 275  23 939  1 907331 
 
  Simple 
Scenario  
Medium 
Scenario  
High Scenario  
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Day # 2 
Term deposit (domestic) 1 395 970  1 240 862  1 008201 
Demand deposit (domestic) 65 232  
 
13 046  
 
48 924  
 
Demand deposit (foreign) 28 084  
 
24 635  
 
21 351  
 
New cash outflow (during a day)  -29 495  212 220 350 102  
Liquid assets (after 1 day) 1 584 165  1 697 320  1 568323  
assets less or non-liquid (after 1 day) 1 737 368 1 720 356 1 737911 
New cash inflow (during one day) -244 407  -114 241  -1 948378 
Net cash inflow since the beginning of the year 4 363  -302 522  -391 149 
  
  Simple 
Scenario  
Medium 
Scenario  
High Scenario  
Day # 3 
Term deposit (domestic) 1 240 862  1 085 755  853 093  
Demand deposit (domestic) 97 847  
 
195 695  
 
293 542  
 
Demand deposit (foreign) 27 920  
 
21 351  
 
19 708  
 
New cash outflow (during a day)  122 656  -24 256  -87 868  
Liquid assets (after 1 day) 1 810 474 1 923 629 1 774265 
assets less or non-liquid (after 1 day) 1 755 465  1 737 911  1 737368  
New cash inflow (during one day) -244 407  -243 864  -205 399  
Net cash inflow since the beginning of the year -362 700  -522 130  -508 679 
 
Appendix 3: -S t r e s s  test du L.C.R (based on December-2012) 
  Simple Scenario  Medium 
Scenario  
High Scenario  
Day # 1 
Stable deposit 105 844 105 844 211 688 
Less stable deposits 590 325 559 256 466 046 
New cash outflow (during one day) 983 666 1 014 736 1 002 101 
Very liquid assets -A1- (after a day) 1 368 025 1 596 029 1 368 025 
Liquid Assets -2A- (after one day) 679 388 643 631 536 359 
Assets that are not liquid or poorly liquid-2B- (after 1 day) 207 951 207 951 212 329 
New cash inflow (during one day) 958 719 766 472 1 097 370 
Net cash inflow since the beginning of the year -24 947 -248 264 95 269 
Day # 2 
Stable deposit 105 844 211 688 370 454 
Less stable deposits 559 256 497 116 434 977 
New cash outflow (during one day) 31 070 -43 705 -127 696 
Very liquid assets -A1- (after a day) 1 596 029 1 710 032 1 580 069 
Liquid Assets -2A- (after one day) 643 631 536 359 455 547 
Assets that are not liquid or poorly liquid-2B- (after 1 day) 210 140 214 517 210 206 
New cash inflow (during one day) -194 436 -2 460 807 -2 245 792 
Net cash inflow since the beginning of the year -250 453 -2 417 103 -2 118 096 
Day # 3 
Stable deposit 211 688 317 532 582 142 
Less stable deposits 528 186 434 977 341 767 
New cash outflow (during one day) -74 774 -43 705 -118 479 
Very liquid assets -A1- (after a day) 1 824 034 1 938 036 2 234 441 
Liquid Assets -2A- (after one day) 607 873 460 196 416 214 
Assets that are not liquid or poorly liquid-2B- (after 1 day) 212 329 212 329 210 140 
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New cash inflow (during one day) -194 436 -149 653 -614 973 
Net cash inflow since the beginning of the year -370 114 -2 523 052 -2 614 591 
 
